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Abstract
We model merger waves as reallocation waves, and argue that mergers
spread new technology in a way that is similar to that of entry and exit of
firms. We focus on two periods: 1890-1930 during which electricity and the
internal combustion engine spread through the U.S. economy, and 1971-2001 —
the Information Age.
1 Introduction
The Q-theory of investment implies that reallocation waves should be times when the
dispersion in Q’s among firms is high. Capital flows from low-Q firms to high-Q firms.
Eisfeldt and Rampini (2002) have recently made this explicit in a business cycle model
and found that reallocation of capital and the dispersion of Q are both pro-cyclical.
Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) have shown that the reallocation of capital via merger
also responds to the dispersion in Q. Here we formulate a theory of economy-wide
merger waves as reallocation episodes prompted by the arrival of major technologies
that raise the dispersion in Q among existing and potential new firms. Through the
lens of our model, we study the 20th Century and argue that of the five major merger
waves, all but the middle wave came about because of the pressure to reallocate
capital, pressure that came from two general-purpose technologies — electricity and
information technology.
When adopting a new technology, a firm may re-train some of its workers and
replace others; it can re-fit its buildings and equipment, where possible, and replace
the rest. If it fails in the attempt to reorganize internally, the firm will probably
disappear and its assets will be reorganized externally. In that case the firm will
either liquidate, or it will be taken over. Either way, however, the existing human
and physical capital simply changes management. New technology spreads faster if
such reallocation works smoothly. This paper studies these mechanisms.
∗NYU and the University of Chicago, and Vanderbilt University. We thank the NSF for support,
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Figure 1: Reallocated capital and its components as percentages of stock market
value, with merger waves shaded, 1890-2001.
We study and measure, in particular, the two external adjustment mechanisms
— mergers and entry-and-exit (E&E) — using the stock-market capitalization of the
firms involved. In Figure 1, the U-shaped top line is our estimate of the total amount
of capital that has been reallocated on the U.S. stock market over the past 112
years. Its components are the stock market capitalization of entering and exiting
firms divided by two, and the value of merger targets. E&E, given by the center line,
is a rough measure of how much capital exits from the stock market and comes back
in under diﬀerent ownership, or at least under a diﬀerent name.1 The lower line is
1Entries and exits for 1926-2001 are defined as firms that enter or leave the stock files distributed
by the University of Chicago’s Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP). Delisting from
CRSP can occur due to liquidation, bankruptcy, financial distress, or lack of investor interest.
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the stock-market value of merger targets.2
The bottom panel shows the five merger waves and at the very top we list the
names commonly given to these waves.3 This paper will argue, however, that the first
two waves represent a form of external reallocation of resources in response to the
simultaneous arrival of two general purpose technologies (GPTs) — electricity and (to
a lesser extent) internal combustion — and that the last two represent reallocation in
response to the arrival of the microcomputer and information technology (IT). The
middle “Conglomerate” wave, which is sometimes attributed to “managerial hubris,”
does not seem to fit our story. Two specific points emerge in Figure 1:
1. Each merger wave was accompanied by a rise in E&E. The deviations from
trend are positively related — the correlation is 0.46.
2. Total reallocation has no significant trend, but mergers have grown relative to
E&E — the ratio rises by a factor of 9, from 0.18 in the 1890’s to 1.63 in the
1990’s.
Fact 1 arises, we argue, because society will use both margins of external adjust-
ment in response to a technological shock. Fact 2 arises, we believe, because of the
increased importance of teamwork and organization capital, which also has caused
market values of companies to rise relative to their book values.
Our contrast of two periods of major technological change — electrification (1890-
1930) and IT (1970-2002) is in the spirit of David (1991).
Before assigning a firm as an “exit” we check the list of hostile takeovers from Schwert (2000) for
1975-1996 and individual issues of the Wall Street Journal for 1997-2001 to ensure that we record
firms taken private under hostile tender oﬀers as mergers. For 1885-1925, we identify entries and
disappearances from the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) using contemporary newspapers. The
stock market capitalizations used to form the ratios in Figure 1 are also from CRSP for 1925-2001
and our backward extension of CRSP for earlier years. For the pre-1925 period, prices and par values
are from the The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, which is also the source of firm-level data for
the price indexes reported in the Cowles Commission’s Common Stock Prices Indexes (1939), and
book capitalizations are from Bradstreet’s, The New York Times, and The Annalist. The resulting
dataset, though limited to annual observations, actually includes more common stocks than the
CRSP files in 1925. Coverage for the NYSE begins in 1885, the AMEX in 1962, and NASDAQ in
1972.
2We identify targets for 1926-2001 as the 9,236 firms that exited CRSP due to merger. For 1895-
1930 we use the original worksheets for mergers in the manufacturing and mining sectors from Nelson
(1959), and for 1885-1894 we use the financial news section of weekly issues of the Commercial and
Financial Chronicle. The target series in Figure 1 includes the market values of exchange-listed
firms in the year prior to their acquisition.
3We define the shaded merger “waves” as starting when the series for target value stays above a
tightly-specified HP trend (λ=100 in the RATS filter program) for two or more consecutive years.
The wave “ends” when the series falls below trend for two consecutive years.
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2 Model
First we describe a standard one-technology “Ak” model; we then add a second
technology with its own capital that suddenly and unexpectedly becomes available.
2.1 One-technology model
Preferences are
1
1− σ
Z ∞
0
e−ρtc1−σt dt,
aggregate output is
y = zk,
capital evolves as
k˙ = −δk + x,
and the income identity is
y = c+ x.
Equating the marginal product of capital, z, to the user cost of capital, r + δ, and
substituting into the consumer’s first-order conditions for optimal consumption c˙/c =
(r − ρ) /σ gives us the constant-growth-rates of income and consumption
y˙
y =
c˙
c =
z − δ − ρ
σ .
This model has no transitional dynamics because it is linear in a single state variable,
k, and there are no adjustment costs.
2.2 A second technology arrives
Starting from a state in which all its capital embodies a technology z1, how does the
economy transit to a state in which all its capital embodies technology z2? If the
arrival of z2 at t = 0 was unexpected, the growth rate before the transition would
have been (z1 − δ − ρ) /σ, and after the transition is over at date T the growth rate
will be (z2 − δ − ρ) /σ. For the intervening T periods, two kinds of capital coexist,
k1 and k2. This is the era of reallocation.
De novo investment and upgrading New capital can be produced from the
consumption good, or from old capital.
De novo entry of k2.–As is usual in one-sector growth models, the production
function for new capital (not counting depreciation) is
k˙2 = x2, (1)
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where x2 is the consumption foregone for the purpose of creating k2.
Two technologies for converting k1 into k2 or into c.–We shall model these up-
grading costs as convex costs of adjustment. We assume two distinct upgrading
activities, one of which involves only k1 while the other requires both k1 and k2. The
intuition is easiest if we imagine that k1 and k2 must reside in diﬀerent firms — call
these z1-firms and z2-firms.
1. Conversion via “Exit”. Let ∆1 be amount of k1 that the z1-firms retire and
convert into an equal number, ∆1, of units of the consumption good. In so
doing, they forego
ψ
µ
∆1
k1
¶
k1
units of output. Assume that ψ is increasing, convex and diﬀerentiable with
ψ0 (0) = 0. This adjustment cost is homogeneous of degree 1 in (∆1, k1).
2. Conversion via “Acquisition”. Let ∆2 be the total amount of k1 that the z2-
firms acquire from z1-firms and convert into ∆2 units of k2. In so doing, they
forego
φ
µ
∆2
k2
¶
k2
units of output. Assume that φ is increasing, convex and diﬀerentiable with
φ0 (0) = 0. This adjustment cost is homogeneous of degree 1 in (∆2, k2).
Output and the evolution of k1 and k2. During the transition, t ∈ [0, T ], and
both k1 and k2 are used. Net of upgrading costs, output is
y = (z1 − ψ [ε]) k1 + (z2 − φ [m]) k2, (2)
where
ε ≡ ∆1k1
is the exit rate of k1, and
m = ∆2k2
is the acquisitions rate relative to k2. Consumption is
c = y − x1 − x2.
The two capital stocks evolve as follows:
k˙1 = −δk1 + x1 − (εk1 +mk2) (3)
k˙2 = −δk2 + x2 + εk1 +mk2. (4)
These two laws of motion are standard but for the reallocation term εk1+mk2, which
is subtracted from the right-hand side of (3) and added back in (4).
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2.3 Equilibrium
Equilibrium consists of m, ε, x1, and x2 such that firms maximize and the represen-
tative agent consumes optimally. The initial conditions are k1,0 = 1, k2,0 = 0, and the
aggregate laws of motion (3) and (4) hold with the added restriction that k1,t ≥ 0.
The model has neither external eﬀects nor monopoly power and the Appendix uses
the planner’s problem to derive the equilibrium formally. In this section we shall give
the market-economy interpretation.
Upgrading.–Let q be the price of k1, and Q the price of k2. Optimal upgrading
by z1-firms implies that
ψ0 (ε) = Q− q (5)
and optimal upgrading by z2-firms implies that
φ0 (m) = Q− q. (6)
In both cases the replacement cost for k1 is q, and the upgraded capital has a price
of Q. The diﬀerence between the two is equated, in (5) and (6), to the marginal cost
of adjustment.4
Investment.–We assume that x2 > 0. Then
Q = 1.
On the other hand, it will turn out that q < 1 for all t ∈ [t, T ), and therefore x1 = 0
throughout the transition.
Output and upgrading rents.– k1 and k2 play a dual role here. Each produces
output, and each assists in the upgrading process. Upgrading is subject to increasing
marginal costs and so, in equilibrium, entails a rent. The per-unit upgrading rent
that k1 draws is
πε (q) ≡ max
ε
{ε− (qε+ ψ [ε])} ,
and the per-unit rent that k2 draws is
πm (q) ≡ max
m
{m− (qm+ φ [m])} .
Consumption growth during the transition is
c˙
c =
1
σ (z2 + π
m (q)− ρ− δ) (7)
and the rate of interest is
r = z2 − δ + πm (q) .
Output in (2) rises monotonically because, by (5) and (6), ε and m both decline
monotonically. This is driven by the monotonic rise in q that we are about to show.
4In our partial-equilibrium treatment of takeovers as an investment (Jovanovic and Rousseau
2002), the equivalent of (6) is eq. (8). That paper also assumes adjustment costs on x which we
have suppressed here in order to keep the analysis manageable.
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The monotonic rise in q during the transition If we can solve for q, we shall
be able to infer ε, m, πε (q), πm (q), c˙/c, and r. The price of k1 must be such that
the marginal product of k1 equals its user cost:
z1 + πε (q) = (r + δ) q − q˙.
Since Q˙ = 0, the corresponding condition for k2 is
z2 + πm (q) = r + δ.
Combining these two conditions and eliminating r we are left with5
q˙
q = z2 + π
m (q)− (z1 + π
ε [q])
q . (8)
Let q∗ be the largest value of q at which
z2 + πm (q) =
(z1 + πε [q])
q
for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Since πm (q) = πε (q) = 0 when q ≥ 1, we have 0 < q∗ < 1. This
rest-point q∗ is unstable from above:
q > q∗ =⇒ q˙ > 0.
But q must approach unity as t→ T because as of date T , k1,t becomes zero and εt
and mt must both become zero. That is, since φ0 (0) = 0, a unit of k1 is at date T as
valuable as a unit of k2 because it can be upgraded costlessly. It must therefore be
that
q0 ∈ (q∗, 1) and qT = 1
and, from (8), that q˙ > 0 throughout the transition. Finally, q˙T = z2 − z1. Figure 2
illustrates the solution for qt.
2.4 Summary of implications
The qualitative implications are as follows:
1. At t = 0, output falls from z1k1 to (z1 − ψ [ε0]) k1 and then starts to rise
monotonically.
2. The value of capital also falls from 1 to q0. Wealth falls from k1,0 to q0k1,0.
3. Thereafter, qt rises monotonically to 1, and k1 falls monotonically to zero at
date T , as do ε and m.
5This equation is derived for the planner’s shadow price of k1 in (17) of the Appendix.
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Figure 2: The solution for qt.
4. Total exits, qεk1, decline monotonically, whereas total acquisitions, qmk2, start
and end at zero and are, essentially, inverted U-shaped during the transition.
5. The rate of interest jumps from z1 − δ to z2 − δ + πm (q0) and then declines
monotonically to z2 − δ where it remains thereafter.
6. Consumption falls at date zero. After that consumption growth declines monoton-
ically. More precisely,
gc =



z1−δ−ρ
σ for t < 0
z2+πm(qt)−δ−ρ
σ for t ∈ (0, T )
z2−δ−ρ
σ for t ≥ T.
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3 Simulations
We now simulate the model. We assume that σ = 1 and that adjustment costs are
quadratic:
φ (m) = m
2
2µ and ψ (ε) =
ε2
2ν . (9)
The date-0 initial conditions are
k1 = 1 and k2 = 0,
and the other boundary conditions are
k1,T = 0, (10)
and
qT = 1. (11)
Finally, because the shock is unforeseen, the present value of consumption as of date
zero (just after the shock) equals wealth, which is just q0k1,0. Since k1,0 ≡ 1, the last
condition is
q0 =
Z T
0
exp
µ
−
Z t
0
rsds
¶
ctdt+ exp
µ
−
Z T
0
rsds
¶
cT
ρ (12)
because t ≥ T , r − g = (z2 − δ)− (z2 − δ − ρ) = ρ.
Parameter choices are reported in Figures 3 and 4. We will focus the empirical
discussion on the three parameters that summarize the gains to reallocation (z2 − z1)
and the costs (µ, ν). We will discuss the micro evidence on these parameters in detail
later.
Parameter Assumed Value Source
Electricity IT
z2 − z1 0.015
Maksimovic and Phillips (2001),
Harris, Siegel, and Wright (2002)
ν 2.7, 0.06 Physical k: Ramey and Shapiro (2001),
Human k: Neal (1995)
µ 2.7, 0.6 Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002),
Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987)
If we assume that discounting is at a rate of five percent per year, the value of
ρ = 0.10 determines the period-length at 2 years. In both of the simulations we have
assumed that the new technology doubles the rate of growth from z1 − ρ = 0.015,
or three-quarters of a percent per year before the transition, to z2 − ρ = 0.03, or 1.5
percent per year after the transition. The adjustment-cost parameters, µ and ν, are
set much higher implying a far smaller adjustment cost than the micro evidence (see
Sections 4.2 and 4.3 below) suggests. Our main interest is in how the diﬀusion of the
new technology is implemented. The three ways in which k2/k1 grows are:
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1. Acquisitions. Relative to market capitalization, acquisitions are
M = qmk2k2 + qk1
. (13)
2. Exits. Relative to market capitalization, exit is
E = qεk1k2 + qk1
, (14)
and E must decline on average from ε at t = 0 to zero at date T .
3. De novo investment.
X = x2k2 + qkt
.
These three series are plotted in the upper left panels of Figures 3 and 4. During
the electricity period, exits were several times as important as acquisitions, and this
is the main result that we obtain in Simulation 1 (Figure 3), along with a transition
that lasts 32 years. If teamwork and organization capital have indeed become more
important and the cost of destroying them has risen, this implies a fall in ν. Simulation
2 (Figure 4) raises the ratio µ/ν by a factor of 10, and although it achieves the needed
substitution of acquisitions for exits, the transition still takes 32 years.
Simulation 1 shows k2 overtaking k1 after 10 years. When we raise the adjustment
costs in simulation 2, Figure 4 shows that overtaking does not occur until the 17th
year. Since, in Simulation 2, φ and ψ are much higher than in Simulation 1, it is
surprising that we do not see more substitution towards X. Exits lead acquisitions
in both simulations. Finally in the last panel we plot the new productivity relative
to old trend and find that the productivity slowdown lasts about 7 years in both
simulations.
Now we compare the simulations with the aggregate data. In the upper left
panels of Figures 3 and 4 we simulated M , E, and X, and now we look at their
actual behavior. Figure 5 is the empirical counterpart.
Acquisitions should be inverted-U in that a merger wave must begin and end at
zero. Figure 5 shows that mergers crest during the second half of each transition.
Since k1 is decreasing, total exits should fall over the transition. Figure 5 shows
that exits have a slight negative trend, though the T-statistics in regressions of exits
on trend are only 1.27 for the electricity era and 0.90 for the IT era.
We also simulated X in Figures 3 and 4, but in practice we do not know the
investment for firms that actually traded on the stock market. For the economy as a
whole, investment net of residential structures averaged 10.5% of GDP for 1890-1930
10
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Figure 3. Transitional dynamics for “Electricity” model.
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Figure 4. Transitional dynamics for “IT” model.
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Figure 5. The values of exiting firms and merger targets in two technological epochs.
      (a) Q’s by investment subgroup       (b) the ratio of exiting and target firm q’s to acquirer Q’s
  Figure 6. Prices of the two types of capital in the IT transition.
and 11.5% for 1970-2001.6 These shares are much higher than in our simulations,
but the units are not the same. If the aggregate capital stock was about three times
nominal output from 1890-1930 and about two and a half times output from 1970-
2001, we can divide each average by these multiples to express investment as shares
of stock market capitalization, assuming of course that listed firms form their capital
stocks in the same way as unlisted ones. The resulting investment shares of 3.5%
for 1890-1930 and 4.6% for 1970-2001 are much closer to the simulations. Panel (b)
of Figure 5 shows the upward trend in investment that the model predicts for the
transitions, but panel (a) does not.
Using the average market-to-book ratios of exiting and target firms as a proxy
for q, panel (a) of Figure 6 shows that q has been rising during the IT episode. But
so has Q when measured as the average market-to-book values of acquirers, and this
flatly contradicts the implication that Q = 1.7 The model could explain values of
Q in excess of unity if we put in adjustment costs for de novo investment, but this
complicates the algebra and probably would not aﬀect the implications about the
time path of q/Q. Moreover, part of the rise in both q and Q may be due to the
rising importance of unmeasured components of k2 that are not on the firms’ books.
It is better, therefore, to concentrate on the ratio q/Q. In the theory, Q is unity and
so
q = qQ.
The theory predicts a monotonic rise in this ratio. Panel (b) of Figure 6 shows that
the ratio has indeed risen, but much faster than the simulation in the third panel of
Figure 4.
Contrasting the 2 ways converting k1 into k2.–A key implication of the model is
that exits should lead mergers. This is indeed so, but the series for exits and mergers
during our two technological eras in Figure 5 are quite variable at high frequencies,
which makes this implication more diﬃcult to observe. In Figure 7 we apply the
Hodrick-Prescott filter to these series and normalize the area under each curve to
unity. For the electrification era in panel (a) exits are indeed downward sloping as
6We obtain private domestic fixed investment and its deflator for 1970-2001 from the August 2002
issue of the Survey of Current Business (Table 1, pp. 123-4, and Table 3, pp. 135-6) and exclude
non-farm residential investment. We use Kendrick (1961, Table A-IIa, column 7) for 1890-1930, and
subtract residential nonfarm construction from worksheets underlying Kuznets (1961, Table T-11).
7We use the Compustat files to compute firm q’s, and define market value as the sum of common
equity at current share prices (the product of items 24 and 25), the book value of preferred stock
(item 130), and short- and long-term debt (items 34 and 9). Book values are computed similarly,
but use the book value of common equity (item 60) rather than the market value.
Since the company coverage within Compustat is very thin before 1972, we begin to compute
Q’s at this time. We count firms that disappear from Compustat as targets or exits, but only if the
firm has been on the files for at least two years. Thus, the series for q¯ and q¯/Q begin in 1974. We
omitted q’s for firms with negative values for net common equity from the plot since they imply
negative market-to-book ratios, and eliminated observations with market-to-book values in excess
of 100, since many of these are likely to be serious data errors.
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Figure 7: HP-filtered and normalized distributions of exits, mergers, and used capital
sales.
our simulations suggest, and mergers dominate later in the reallocation wave. The
mean of the exit series before filtering occurs in 1903, about one-third of the way
into the reallocation wave, and that of mergers in 1910, at about the halfway point.
For the IT revolution, exits also fall, with mergers growing in intensity as the wave
progresses. In this case, the mean of the series before filtering occurs halfway into
the wave in 1985 for exits, and two-thirds of the way into the wave in 1989 for
mergers. Thus, the means of these distributions suggest that exits led mergers in
the two reallocation waves, and that reallocation in general occured later in the IT
revolution than for the electrification era. Both of these facts are consistent with our
simulations.
The trading of used physical capital is also correlated with mergers. The dashed
line in panel (b) of Figure 7 shows this fact. It plots, after H-P filtering, direct sales
of used capital among exchange-listed firms as percentages of their total investment
from 1971 to 2001. Since this disinvestment is like partial exit, we expect it to be
correlated with exits, and it does move with exits, at least early on. But this capital
is also purchased mainly by incumbent firms, and in that sense it should behave like
acquisitions. It does so, especially later on in the wave.8 We derive the series using
8In the model such trades between incumbents would not take place because they would involve
two adjustment costs; the total adjustment cost of selling ∆ units of capital by k1 firms to k2
firms would be ψ
³
∆
k1
´
k1 + φ
³
∆
k2
´
k2. The data indicate that the total real value of used capital
transactions, cumulated from 1971-2000, is only 21.3 percent of real target capitalization over this
same period.
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all firms common to CRSP and Standard and Poor’s Compustat.9 The correlation
coeﬃcient between the series for mergers and used capital purchases before filtering
is 0.44.
4 Evidence on z1, z2, φ, and ψ
The values of z1 and z2 were the same in the two simulations, whereas φ and ψ were
chosen to be lower in the IT era than in the Electrification era. We now discuss some
of the evidence on these parameters.
4.1 Estimates of z1, and z2
The growth of consumption over the century was about 0.015, and z1 (together with
the other parameters) was chosen to deliver this. For z2 − z1, which we set at 0.015,
we consulted various studies of productivity-enhancing eﬀects of takeovers. For the
United States, Maksimovic and Phillips (2001, p. 2053) find a productivity enhance-
ment of 2%. For the United Kingdom, Harris, Siegel, and Wright (2002) find that,
before the takeover, the target plants were 1.6%-2% less productive than other plants
in the same industry. Thus the gains to reallocation are roughly in the range of these
estimates.
4.2 Micro-estimates of φ
Our only reliable estimates of φ come from Q-regressions of acquisition investment.
Like physical investment, acquisitions are not very sensitive to Q− q, and this gives
us implied adjustment costs that are three or four times larger than what the macro
data from the corresponding period seem to imply.
If φ (m) = m2
2µ , (6) reads m = µ (Q− q). In Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) we fit
this equation to Compustat data on acquired capital. We took Q to be the acquirer’s
Q, and q to be that of the target. Table 1 of that paper reports the estimate of
µˆ = 0.022 — after being divided by 100 in order to get it into the present units.
Although larger than the estimated response of physical investment, this estimate
for µ is low and implies huge adjustment costs. It must, however, be adjusted for
the tendency for firms to operate in several diﬀerent markets. The diversification of
firms’ activities means that their relative Q’s reflect their average eﬃciency over all
the divisions and plants that they own, and not necessarily their competence in the
area where they are buying the capital in question. This presents us with a classical
9Capital sales include property, plant, and equipment (Compustat item 107). Investment is the
sum of acquired capital (item 129) and direct capital expenditures (item 128). We compute the
series for used capital sales shown in panel (b) of Figure 7 after summing each data item across
active firms in each year.
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errors-in-variables inference problem so that µˆ is biased down. How much downward
bias we should expect depends on how many divisions the acquiring firm has and how
much of variation in the division-specific “Q”s (these are theoretical, not empirical
concepts) is common and explained by the firm-specific eﬀect. If the eﬃciencies of
the various divisions of the acquiring firm were independent random variables, and if
these divisions were equal in size, then the firm’s Q would be an average of the Q’s
of its division:
Q = 1N
NX
i=1
Qi.
Our estimates are for the acquirers in Compustat. Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987)
report that in a sample of 471 large manufacturing firms in 1975, the number of four-
digit manufacturing categories in which the firms operated was 7.5. We shall assume
that N = 7.5 and that the Qi are independent so that there are no firm-specific eﬀects
on eﬃciency, only division-specific eﬀects. This gives us the adjusted estimate
µˆ∗ = 7.5 (0.022) = 0.17.
Two opposing biases on this number are the following: The bulk of the target capital
was acquired by firms that were larger than the mean size in this sample. This
suggests that the relevant N and, hence, relevant µˆ should be larger than this. On
the other hand, the presence of firm-specific influences on eﬃciency suggests that the
errors-in-variables bias on the coeﬃcient of Q− q should be smaller.
In spite of this adjustment, µˆ∗ is lower, and the φ that it implies is higher than
will give the best fit to the macro data for the IT episode. The simulations that fit the
best for the IT episode take µ = 0.6, implying that adjustment costs were 3.2 times
smaller than implied by µˆ∗. On the other hand, the simulations for the electrification
episode take µ = 2.7, which is much higher and implies a far smaller adjustment cost.
In that sense, µˆ∗ is, at least, between the two values that the simulations assume. We
shall return to the issue of the secular decline in µ in section 5.4.
4.3 Micro-estimates of ψ
We do better in this dimension, probably because we do not use Q− investment
regressions which are known to deliver large adjustment costs. We have other kinds
of evidence on both the physical-capital and human-capital side. This evidence is
that the salvage value of physical capital is significantly lower than that for human
capital.
Physical capital.–Evidence on physical capital’s salvage value is in Ramey and
Shapiro (2001). Consider the resources lost when a z1−firm retires some of its capital.
Let pi be the sales price divided by the purchase price of machine i. Table 3 of Ramey
and Shapiro reports the data. Per dollar spent on the machine, the firm’s cost of
retiring machine i is Ci ≡ 1 − pi. We imagine that if the firm were to retire some
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of its capital, it would first sell oﬀ those machines for which pi was closest to unity,
and so on in order of descending pi. Suppose the firm has k1 machines on hand,
i = 1, 2, ....k1. Let G
³
i
k1
´
be the cumulative distribution of Ci among the stock of
machines:
Ci = G
µ
i
k1
¶
.
The total cost to the firm of retiring εk1 machines is ψ (ε) k1, where
ψ (ε) =
Z εk1
0
G
µ
s
k1
¶
ds
=
Z ε
0
G (s0) ds0,
after the change of variables s0 = s/k1.
Now suppose that the Ci are distributed uniformly on the interval [0, ν], so that
G (s) = 1ν s. Then ψ (ε) = ε2/2ν. The age-aggregated data underlying Figure 3 of
Ramey and Shapiro’s paper were kindly supplied us by Valerie Ramey, and we plot
them in Figure 8. Indeed, there are more Ci values close to unity than to zero. But
the opposite is true on the human capital side (below), and we shall argue for these
reasons that ν = 1.0 is a good approximation.
Human capital.–Evidence on human capital’s salvage value is in Neal (1995). The
impact eﬀect (which depends a lot on occupation and whether or not the worker finds
a new job in the same industry and occupation) of a displacement is roughly 15%
of wages. Wages do recover within a few years, but if we assume that the recovery
is because of further investment on the job, then we can take the 15% number to
be a permanent eﬀect. This estimate comes from a 14% loss among switchers and a
6% loss among stayers at time of interview. However, stayers’ wages grew at 2% per
year from time of displacement to re-interview and switcher wages grew at 1% per
year during this interval. Since average time from displacement to re-interview is 3
years, this gives a 17% loss for switchers and a 12% loss for stayers. There are more
switchers than stayers by almost 2 to 1, thus 15% seems about right. On the other
hand, experienced workers with long tenure who switch following displacement lose
much more than 15% on average.
This is a mean over all displaced workers, comparable to the mean discount on
the average machine sold by the Ramey-Shapiro defense-contracting firm. Now we
interpret pi as the fraction of human capital salvaged. The analog of the data in
Figure 8, if they were plotted, would be much like a mirror image of the data in the
Figure, with most observations lying in the left portion of the graph. This reinforces
the appeal of the uniform distribution on the unit interval for the distribution of
salvage values of all the capital put together. In that case the appropriate value is
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Figure 8: Frequency distribution of 1-pi from the Ramey and Shapiro (2001) data.
ν = 1.0. This is roughly half-way between the values of 2.7 and 0.06 that we used in
the first and second simulations respectively.10
5 Other evidence
In this section we report evidence of a more general nature, but still helpful for
evaluating the model.
5.1 Acquisitions and sectoral exposure to GPTs
Andrade et al (2001) argue that technological and deregulation shocks are behind
the merger waves in the high-merger sectors in the ‘80s and ‘90s. If that is so, then
a new GPT, which applies to most sectors, should prompt an economy-wide merger
wave. But if 1890-1930 and 1970-2002 are indeed GPT diﬀusion eras, then we should
10We have simplified the algebra by assuming that φ and ψ are both convex in spite of evidence that
investment is lumpy and, as we found in Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002, Figure 5) that acquisitions
are even more lumpy than investment. Similarly, exit is also likely to involve fixed costs.
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have seen more upgrading and reallocation in the sectors that were absorbing more
of the two GPT’s.
To show this, we run a "value-weighted" least squares regression of real target
values as a percent of sectoral market value on a measure of sectoral absorption of
the two GPTs at the tail end of the two episodes. For electrification, the measure of
sectoral absorption is the ratio of the share of sectoral horsepower that is electrified
in 1929 to the share in 1919, and the data are from David (1991). For IT, the
absorption measure is the ratio of the share of IT capital (equipment and software)
in each sector’s capital stock in 2000 to the share in 1990, and the data are from
the fixed assets tables of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (2002). The acquisitions
that we report are for 1925-30 and 1997-2000 (the merger waves as defined in Figure
1).11 That is, we look at the growth of the GPT shares over 10-year periods and then
report acquisitions during the end-of-period wave. The value-weighted least squares
regression is simply generalized least squares with each moment condition weighted
by the corresponding sector’s share in total GPT capital.12
Figure 9 illustrates the regression results, with the areas of the circles propor-
tional to the weighting factors. The two panels of the figure are comparable, and are
constrained by the sectoral investment data that we could find for the first epoch.
The relation is positive in both epochs, but more so for the electrification era.
We also ran the regression with standard (i.e., unweighted) OLS. For the electri-
fication era, the results were
M = 4.801+
(2.9)
1.371 Share1929/1919
(1.9)
N = 14, R2 = .50,
with t-statistics in parentheses. For the IT era, we got
M = −7.449+
(−1.6)
7.592 Share2000/1990
(3.3)
N = 62, R2 = .06,
which are weaker, but qualitatively similar to our findings with value-weighted OLS.
5.2 Acquisitions, exits and IPOs by sector
If m and ε are performing the same sort of reallocative function, then they should be
positively correlated over sectors. It turns out that they are. The rank correlations
11A good deal of U.S. merger activity took place outside of the stock exchange over the 1890-1930
period, and a sectoral breakdown would not be possible unless we use these oﬀ-exchange transactions.
Panel (a) of Figure 9 therefore uses all targets and sector designations recorded in the worksheets
underlying Nelson (1959), and then divides by the total value of exchange-listed firms belonging to
a given sector to form the vertical axis quantities. Panel (b) of Figure 9 reflects activity among
exchange-listed firms only.
12In other words, for the electrification era, we weight the observations by the share of total
electrical horsepower that resides in each sector, whereas for the IT era we weight by the share of
IT-capital (computer equipment and software) that resides in each sector.
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  Figure 9. Target values vs. changes in GPT shares over 10-year periods by sector.  
between IPOs and exits on the one hand and acquisitions on the other, with ranks
based upon the percentage of each in total sector value (with the merger samples as
defined in fn. 11) are given below.
Period rank correlation significance # of sectors
Mergers and IPOs
1925-1930 0.718 1% 15
1997-2000 0.480 1% 62
Mergers and Exits
1925-1930 0.343 10% 15
1997-2000 0.847 1% 62
These results fit the model well, with all three forms of reallocation highly correlated
across sectors.
5.3 The stock-market drop
Initial stock-market capitalization is k1. Right after the shock, it falls to qk1. With
k1 = 1,the stock market thus exhibits an immediate drop at t = 0, from 1 to q.13
Figure 10 shows that the stock market declined in 1973-74.14 No such sudden drop
is visible for stock prices in the early 1890’s. Maybe this is because the market
was thin and unrepresentative in those days, with railway stocks absorbing a large
chunk of market capitalization. More likely, the realization that the new technology
would work well was more gradual and was not prompted by any single event like the
completion of the Niagara Falls dam in 1894.
5.4 The secular rise of acquisitions relative to exit and entry
Figure 1 shows a nine-fold increase in the ratio of acquisitions to E&E. We do not
explain the trend here, but we can re-formulate the puzzle in terms of our two adjust-
ment costs. Assume they are quadratic as in (9). Then (6) and (5) readm = µ (1− q)
and ε = ν (1− q) . Note that
m
ε =
µ
ν .
If, for some reason, the ratio ν/µ were to fall, ε would fall relative to m. The nine-
fold rise in the ratio of mergers to E&E over the past century suggests that the ratio
µ/ν has risen by an order of magnitude over this period (which is also the diﬀerence
between the first and the second simulations in Figures 3 and 4). “Team capital” or
“organization capital” may today be more important than it was in 1900, and this
13The drop is in this model due entirely to the jump in r. Hobijn and Jovanovic (2001) get a
bigger stock-market drop by assuming that the output produced by the old capital falls in price
when new capital is introduced — i.e., through the obsolescence of old capital.
14We obtain the composite stock price index from Wilson and Jones (2002), and deflate using the
CPI.
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Figure 10: The real Cowles/S&P stock price index across the the transition periods,
1890-1931 and 1970-2001.
makes it worthwhile to preserve the healthy parts of an under-performing firm and fix
only the part that works poorly. If a firm is taken over, its teams and its organization
can remain intact, whereas if it were to exit through bankruptcy its assets and people
will disperse, and this will destroy its team-specific capital.
The M&A sector is much more developed now. One approach to modeling it is
as a market-supplied input into the technology for searching for targets. The input
presumably gets cheaper over time relative to other goods. Matsusaka (2001) and
Faria (2002) are models in which this issue could be studied in more depth.
6 Related work
We mentioned David (1991) earlier. Boldrin and Levine (2001) also have a technology
for converting old capital to new. Since they do not allow goods to be converted into
new capital one for one, their results are diﬀerent. Holmes and Schmitz (1990) discuss
the selling of capital by inventors to managers which resembles the two conversion
activities that we emphasize here. Mortensen and Pissarides (1998) look at constant
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growth, not at transitions, and they focus on the labor market, but their work is
similar in that they have two modes of job improvement that are similar to the two
that we have modeled. Caballero and Hammour (1994) study transitions at business-
cycle frequencies. Finally, Atkeson and Kehoe (2001), Greenwood and Yorukoglu
(1997) and Hornstein and Krusell (1996) study transitions, but they do not focus on
adjustment costs like we do.
Shleifer and Vishny (1992) argue that merger waves are driven by liquidity which
allows the re-assignment of capital among owners to proceed more smoothly. This
suggests that one may augment the adjustment-cost functions φ and ψ to include a
financial factor. Faria (2002) fits a model related to ours to the Telecom merger wave
of the ‘90s. Toxvaerd (2002) models a merger wave as arising as firms rush to buy so
as not to be left without a target.
On the productivity-enhancing role of takeovers — i.e., on the question of why
merged capital and exiting and re-entering capital experiences an eﬃciency rise from
z1 to z2 — we know that exiting plants are less productive than the average plant and
less productive than the average entering plant (Baily, Hulten, and Campbell 1992). A
multi-plant firm is likely to sell oﬀ its least productive plants (Maksimovic and Phillips
2001). Takeovers do seem to have beneficial real eﬀects. Martin and McConnell
(1991) find that managers of takeover targets are more than four times more likely
to be replaced than those same managers before the firm had been selected as a
target. After a takeover their turnover rate jumps from 10% to 40% or so. McGuckin
and Ngyen (1995) and Schoar (2000) find that the productivity of acquiring firms’
plants falls and that the productivity of the targets’ plants rises following a takeover.
Lichtenberg and Siegel (1987) find that plants changing owners had lower initial levels
of productivity and higher subsequent productivity growth than plants that did not
change hands. The above evidence is for the United States. In the United Kingdom
things work roughly the same way, as Harris, Siegel, and Wright (2002) found in
their study of 36,000 manufacturing plants of which nearly 5000 were involved in a
takeover from 1994 to 1998.
Lang, Stultz, and Walkling (1989) and Servaes (1991) find that the mergers that
create the most value are those between high-Q bidders and low-Q targets. Merger
announcements do tend to lead to declines in the prices of acquirer shares. But
Jovanovic and Braguinsky (2002) show that when firms have private information
about the quality of the capital that they own, the bidder discount is consistent with
takeovers being constrained eﬃcient, as they are in the present model.
7 Conclusion
While mergers are probably motivated by a variety of factors, one role that they play,
this paper argues, is that of reallocation of assets toward the more eﬃcient firms. If
this argument is correct, major technological change should lead to merger waves.
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We studied two GPT eras — electricity and IT — and found that this seems to have
been the case. Our model gets some support from historical data.
On the other hand, the fit of the model is far from perfect. We have no explanation
for the conglomeration wave of the 60’s, and the wave of 1900 occurs earlier than our
model suggests that it should have. We have focused on the reallocation role alone
and, overall, it seems to explain merger waves surprisingly well.
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8 Appendix: The planner’s solution
The economy is convex, competitive and there are no external eﬀects. We derive the
optimal solution for the planner here, whereas in the text we reinterpret the optimum
in terms of prices. We use optimal control. The Hamiltonian is
H = e−ρt
½
U [(z1 − ψ [ε]) k1 + (z2 − φ [m]) k2 − x2] + q∗ (− [δ + ε] k1 −mk2)
+Q∗ ([m− δ] k2 + εk1 + x2) + λ∗k1
¾
where e−ρtq∗ is the multiplier on the k˙1 constraint, e−ρtQ∗ is the multiplier on the
k˙2 constraint, and e−ρtλ∗ is the multiplier on the non-negativity of k1. To save on
notation, we have assumed that x1 = 0. This is valid if Q∗ > q∗ so that the planner
values k2 more than k1. We also ignore the nonnegativity constraint on x2. The
FOCs are
∂H
∂m = 0 = −U
0 (c)φ0 (m)− q∗ +Q∗ (15)
∂H
∂ε = 0 = −U
0 (c)ψ0 (ε)− q∗ +Q∗ (16)
∂H
∂x2
= 0 = −U 0 (c) +Q∗
−ρq∗ + q˙∗ = −∂H∂k1
= −U 0 (c) (z1 − ψ [ε]) + (δ + ε) q∗ − εQ∗ + λ∗
−ρQ∗ + Q˙∗ = −∂H∂k2
= −U 0 (c) (z2 − φ [m]) +mq∗ − (m− δ)Q∗.
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Now define
Q = Q
∗
U 0 (c) and q =
q∗
U 0 (c) and λ =
λ∗
U 0 (c) .
Then the equations become
φ0 (m) = Q− q
ψ0 (ε) = Q− q
Q = 1
−ρqU 0 + q˙U 0 + qU˙ 0
U 0 = − (z1 − ψ [ε]) + (δ + ε) q − εQ+ λ
−ρQU 0 + Q˙U 0 +QU˙ 0
U 0 = − (z2 − φ [m]) +mq − (m− δ)Q,
because
−ρq∗ + q˙∗ = −ρqU 0 + q˙U 0 + qU˙ 0
and
−ρQ∗ + Q˙∗ = −ρQU 0 + Q˙U 0 +QU˙ 0.
Since Q = 1, and since k1 > 0 on [0, T ], these conditions simplify to
φ0 (m) = 1− q
ψ0 (ε) = 1− q
q˙U 0 + qU˙ 0
U 0 = − (z1 − ψ [ε])− ε (1− q) + (ρ+ δ) q
and
U˙ 0
U 0 = − (z2 − φ [m]) +m (1− q) + ρ+ δ,
or,
q˙
q +
U˙ 0
U 0 = −
(z1 + πε [q])
q + ρ+ δ
U˙ 0
U 0 = − (z2 + π
m [q]) + ρ+ δ.
This reduces to a single diﬀerential equation for q:
q˙
q = (z2 + π
m [q])− (z1 + π
ε [q])
q . (17)
The only stationary solution would be a value q∗ at which
(z2 − πm [q]) =
(z1 + πε [q])
q
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for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Under mild conditions (e.g., if φ and ψ are the same function),
0 < q∗ < 1,
and the steady state is unstable. That is,
q ≷ q∗ =⇒ q˙q ≷ 0.
Therefore we must have
q0 > q∗,
or else qt could not converge to unity. Now, if this were so, (17) would imply that
lim
t→T
q˙t
qt
= z2 − z1
because limq→1 πi (q) = 0.
One caveat to the above is that it ignores the constraint x2 > 0. If the upgrading
technology is eﬃcient enough, the planner may prefer to set not just x1 (which we
have set equal to zero) but also x2 equal to zero for a while. We have ignored this
constraint, and the solution we derived would not be valid if ψ and especially φ were
low for relatively large values of ε or m.
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